Reforming Mexico’s Labor Law for Independent Labor Unions:
A Legislative Research Report

Abstract:
Reforming Mexico’s Labor Law for Independent Labor Unions analyzes the legal
difficulties Mexican independent labor unions face in establishing themselves and
proposes a legislative solution. The methodology used examines the institutionalized
behaviors of the administrative labor boards and businesses, which prevent the formation
of independent labor unions. The discretion that Mexican labor law affords the labor
boards and businesses explains, in large measure, the obstacles facing independent labor
unions. Having analyzed the relevant legal framework this article proposes specific
legislation to strengthen these independent labor unions. Within the context of a
developing country, Reforming Mexico’s Labor Law for Independent Labor Unions
shows the powerful impact that the law can have on a social problem.
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Part I: Introduction.
“Shortly after Vicente Fox was elected president of Mexico, some investigative
reporters went to the Fox family farms and found underage children working in the field
in violation of Mexico’s Constitution and Federal Labor Law” (Ley Federal del Trabajo:
LFT).1 As this disconcerting example illustrates, Mexico has labor laws, but they do not
have the authorities' backing. In fact, Mexican law guarantees some of the most extensive
of worker’s rights in the world. Yet, for all this legal fanfare, Mexican workers do not
receive the benefits the law promises them. Given the legal guarantees on the books, why
has Mexican labor suffered so?

1. Problem and Proposed Solution.
Bad labor conditions prevail in Mexico in part because the state's labor boards
(Juntas de Conciliación y Arbitraje) prevent the development of non-official labor unions
independent of the state and business. Transformative change to support independent
unions and thereby improve labor conditions calls for a bill reforming the LFT as it
governs the labor boards.

2. Context.
We begin by briefly touching upon globalization to situate the bad labor
conditions as part of this larger challenge. Although the remainder of the research report
focuses on the labor boards' specific problems, our bill must constitute part of a broader
legislative program, which would assist Mexico in overcoming the challenges
globalization poses to workers. We also describe in some detail the prevailing labor
conditions, which demand our attention and concern. Although we recognize freedom of
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association as a right, the fact that independent labor unions concretely improve labor
conditions motivates our bill. In this regard, we present evidence of the critical role that
independent labor unions can play in securing adequate labor conditions. In essence, this
latter part substantiates our view that by supporting independent labor unions, our bill
will, in effect, lead to better labor conditions.

a) Globalization.
Globalization and neoliberal economic policies provides the backdrop explanation
for labor’s crisis. Global competition has taken its toll on Mexican workers. Between
1992 and 1996, with the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 1994 Peso Crisis, workers' wages
dramatically fell by nearly 40%.2 While capital has secured for itself transnational
mobility, as well as, formidable international protections, states have continued to impose
severe restrictions on labor’s freedom of movement (i.e., immigration laws) and have
succeeded in sidelining labor protections in comparison to those for capital. One has
merely to contrast the headlines heralding the World Trade Organization, which goal is to
lower barriers to trade and investment, with the relative obscurity of the International
Labor Organization, which dedicates itself to invigorating workers’ rights. This power
imbalance between labor and capital makes for a race to the bottom as nations compete
against one another to lower labor costs to attract investment. The result is that while
capital may thrive, workers generally do not benefit, but instead suffer the vagaries of
politics and policies at the behest of capital. Nonetheless, while it behooves us to advance
labor rights on an international level, taking steps to ensure them through reforming
national legislation is a necessary first step in the right direction.
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b) Labor Conditions.
The working conditions in Mexico are severe with long and arduous work hours.
In manufacturing labor worked 47 hours a week on average with nearly 80% working
over 40 hours a week and 25% working over 48 hours. Furthermore, while productivity
has increased significantly since the introduction of NAFTA (an astonishing 40%), this
has not translated into higher wages. Standard economics would have us predict that
wages would increase in tandem with an increase in productivity because it claims that
companies pay their workers in function of their value, i.e., their productivity. Reality
contradicts the prediction linking increased productivity to higher labor remuneration.
The 1995 peso devaluation, an exogenous factor it is true, wrought a 32% decline in
wages in the economy overall. Even as of 2002 wages remained 8% lower than prior to
NAFTA and the peso crisis despite the tremendous gains in productivity. Workers have
fared no better in terms of fringe benefits. 42% of workers received nothing in this
regard: neither health insurance nor pensions from their employers. True, the state
provides some measure of assistance in this area, but insufficiently.3
While NAFTA has not brought the benefits promised to Mexican workers, its
side-agreement on labor (the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation:
NAALC) has shined a spotlight on the widespread opprobrious working conditions, most
notably, in the maquiladoras. These enterprises (predominantly owned by international
corporations) manufacture goods for the U.S. economy across the border, i.e., exportprocessing firms in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Under the agreement, private actors
can bring claims against the violators of labor standards to the National Administrative
Organizations set up in the member states (Mexico, U.S., and Canada). Even though

4

states respond minimally to the NAO’s directives, the claims nonetheless serve to
illuminate the state of Mexican labor conditions. Over half the 23 cases filed targeted
firms located in Mexico.4
The U.S. NAO report on the Tijuana Han Young maquiladora case in Mexico
exemplifies the unacceptable labor conditions prevalent in Mexico. Throughout 1997, the
Secretary of Labor and Social Forecasting (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social:
Secretary of Labor), found 41 health and safety violations contravening its national labor
standards. These included the lack of a plant health and safety committee, of health and
safety plans, of employee training, of hazard controls, concerning noise, fume and fire
hazards, of procedures to prevent electrocutions and amputations, and the reliance upon
life-threatening machinery in a state of disrepair. A year later, subsequent to multiple
inspections, the Secretary revealed 36 violations remained uncorrected, along with 9
additional violations. Han Young’s predicament was “resolved” only when the
corporation closed the plant and relocated to another location in the same city of Tijuana.
Meanwhile, they fired those workers involved in the strikes, which had called attention to
the firm’s violations.5

c) Impact of Independent Unions.
We briefly turn to the question of whether or not independent unions would
improve labor conditions assuming our bill would succeed in spurring their growth. A
recent paper undertook just such a study. We first note that in the formal sector union
membership declined from 30% to under 20% from 1984 to 2000. Without unions wages
21% lower in 1984 and 15% lower in 1996 would have prevailed. In the nonwage sector,
workers would have received 40% less in 1984 and 35% less in wages in 1996. In terms
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of fringe benefits, unions obtained a 142% increase in 1992 while only a 26% increase in
1999. Productivity appears to rise 25% among union establishments as compared to
nonunionized firms in 1992 and 12% in 1999. Firms’ profits do not seem adversely
affected by union membership. Not only do unions appear to provide substantial benefits
to union and nonunion workers alike while not detracting from the business’ bottom line,
but the decrease in union membership and thereby workers' bargaining power correlates
with a decrease in the benefits redounding to workers.6 While the results come from only
one study, this study applied the same analytical framework and obtained similar results
as did a well-regarded study conducted in the United States.7 Seen in this light, unions
vigorously defending their workers’ rights can play a critical role in securing better labor
conditions and justifying our bill's aims to encourage these independent and
representative unions.
We have seen that any bill addressing labor conditions must ultimately comprise
part of a larger legislative program to confront globalization's challenges. The deplorable
labor conditions in Mexico demand remedial action. In light of the logic and evidence
indicating that representative unions improve labor conditions our bill seeks to address
this urgent need by removing the obstacles to such labor unions

3. Outline.
The rest of this legislative research report aims to harness reason informed by
experience to change the institutions (relations of repetitive behaviors) that prevent the
organization of independent unions. In "Part II: The Difficulty the Bill Will Address," we
first survey the nature and scope of the problem, i.e., independent unions’ difficulty in
asserting themselves. This part introduces the surface appearance of the problem our bill
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aims to resolve, that is to say, the lack of independent unions. We then describe the
primary role occupants’ behaviors, which bear responsibility for the independent unions'
anemic defense of workers’ interests: the alliance between the state's labor boards and
business. Here we introduce the key players and some of their organizations to identify
who influences the labor boards and to what extent. We also present the problematic
behaviors that the labor boards abet as the LFT's enforcer skewed to favor neoliberal
interests. In effect, as an adjudicatory body the labor boards' condemnable role is to
sanction neoliberal behavior through its interpreting and applying the LFT. In other
words, we describe the labor boards' inputs and outputs. We follow with a social impact
statement assessing how the present situation benefits or hurt the various role occupants.
We then conclude this heading.
In "Part III: Explanation of the Causes of the Behaviors that Comprise the
Difficulty," we explain the role occupants' behaviors in question with the help of the
ROCCIPI methodology. The ROCCIPI methodology serves as a comprehensive program
of analysis comprising Rule, Opportunity/Capacity, Communication of Law, Process,
Interests, and Ideology. We canvass first and foremost the relevant LFT rules governing
the activities in which the role occupants play the principal role. We then analyze the
modalities of these role occupants' behaviors with the aid of the remaining OCCIPI
agenda. For, while the rules, more or less, circumscribe the range of behaviors, the other
OCCIPI modalities determine behavior within the boundaries the rules establish.
In "Part IV: Proposal for a Solution," we examine various alternative proposals,
which have the potential to address the deplorable labor conditions in Mexico generally
and pay special attention to options that purport to foster independent labor unions to this
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end of improving labor conditions. We then explain our proposed bill's major reform
provisions, which support the formation of representative unions. Further, we ascertain
precisely how the bill will help to strengthen independent unions and by extension to
dismantle anti-union state-business alliance. We proceed by linking the mechanisms by
which the bill addresses the causes underlying the specific problematic behaviors. We
also analyze the costs and benefits of the bill to assess its likely consequences. Finally,
we underline the monitoring measures. These measures provide us with the critical
feedback on the bill's effectiveness, which only time and its actual implementation can
reveal. We then conclude.

Part II: The Difficulty the Bill Will Address.
1. Introduction.
Examining the problem serves as the indispensable starting point for the research
report by providing data on the problem the bill seeks to address. To this effect, we begin
by conducting an overview of the challenges independent unions face. We follow by
describing the primary role occupants’ behavior: That of the labor boards and business.
We then offer a short social impact statement describing the costs and benefits of the
present situation and how they redound to each of the role occupants. We then conclude.

2. Nature and Scope of the Difficulty.
Mexican unions often do not represent their workers. The Confederation of
Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos: CTM) and the Labor
Congress (Congreso del Trabajo) represent the two main umbrella organizations for these

8

so-called non-representative officialist unions. They negotiated 81,4% of all collective
contracts.8 Workers' widespread discontent with their unions highlights the nature and
scope of the problem. A survey of workers in the Exclusive Union of Mexican Electrical
Workers (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicano:
SUTERM), a powerful union in Mexico, revealed a strong degree of dissatisfaction with
the union’s internal organization.
“Do you consider that the union leadership is representative of the interests of

47.5%

workers?”
“Do you think that the leadership has been effective in negotiating positive

35%

conditions for workers in terms of wages and benefits?”
“Would you consider the role of union delegates at the section or department

17.5%

level to be satisfactory?”
“Do union assemblies take place timely following the provisions stipulated in

15%

the union statutes?”
“Do you consider that the processes for the selection leaders are clean and

70%

transparent?”
* percentage answering yes from a sampling of 40 SUTERM members (1999-2001).9
While the paucity of such surveys makes their results anecdotal, a study of the
Mexican automobile maquiladora industry tends to corroborate unions'
unrepresentativeness. Unions that genuinely represent their worker strive to achieve
control in the following areas: Promotion procedures and employment security (including
union participation in hiring and promotions, and limitations on temporary workers), the
production process (union participation in determining the production rate, work
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assignments, wage equalization, and occupational health and safety measures), and
specification of conflict resolution procedures. Out of 14 auto plants the study found that
only those three plants with independent unions unaffiliated with CTM had positive
control in these areas of union concern, revealing a dearth in genuinely representative
unions.10
The experiences of three textile maquiladoras provides concrete evidence of the
difficulty of establishing representative unions. In the Han Young case previously
mentioned two years elapsed during which NGOs, both domestic and internationally, as
well as, US government diplomacy pressured the Mexican government to intercede in
favor of the workers. Indeed, the NAO issued a report condemning the Mexican
government’s interposing itself against the workers exercising their right of association.
The case ended only when Han Young fired everyone and relocated. Prior to the cases’
sad denouement, thugs pounced upon and severely beat the leader of the independent
union effort precisely during a government sponsored meeting in response to the Han
Young incident laying bear the impunity of labor rights’ violators.11 Workers’
experiences to form an independent union at the Kundong and Duro maquiladora plants
in Puebla and Rio Bravo met with the same resistance. Workers at these plants succeeded
in establishing a representative union, although their efforts met with success only after 9
months and three years, respectively.12 Government intercession on the workers’ behalf
only took place in the face of significant international NGO pressure, which emphasizes
the tremendous difficulties workers face in establishing independent unions.
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3. Whose and What Behaviors Constitute the Difficulty.
a) Labor Boards.
The state commands the heights of the economy. Congress passes legislation, but
the executive Presidency appoints those in charge of implementing legislative directives.
The President appoints the Secretary of Finance who oversees general economic policy.
The President also appoints the Secretary of Labor and Social Forecasting (Secretaria del
Trabajo y Previsión Social: Secretary of Labor), who oversees the labor boards. Mexico
lacks a professional civil service corps. Prior to the Debt Crisis, executive officials came
instead predominantly from the ranks of politicians who had climbed the PRI echelons. In
the 1980s so-called technocrats began to displace the career politicians. These technocrats
with business or economic backgrounds often originated as powerful businessmen. The
pro-business PAN’s electoral success epitomizes this change and Fox has all the bearings
of a technocrat. He studied at Universidad Iberoamericana and at Harvard’s Business
School and formerly supervised Coca-Cola’s Latin American operations. Similarly, the
present Secretary of Labor, Carlos Abascal, a lawyer specialized in business
administration, left behind a CEO position for an insurance company, and the former
president of the powerful business association, the Mexican Employers' Confederation
(Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicina: COPARMEX). When Duro’s
independent union petitioned to hold a union election on neutral ground he denied the
request. Abascal himself has the primary responsibility for the labor boards and labor
justice.
We now return to the incontrovertible evidence that the boards disfavor
independent unions. In essence, they discriminate against independent unions in favor of
11

officialist unions often times associated with CTM. While CTM affiliates comprise
mostly unions conciliatory with respect to the employer, independent unions threaten a
more aggressive defense of workers’ rights. Fn NAO report concerning two garment
maquiladoras illustrates the difficulties independent unions face: Matamoros Garment
S.A. de C.V. and Tarrant México S.R. de C.V. Workers tried to unionize under the
Center for Worker Support (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador: CAT) in 2003. The board
rejected both petitions for technicalities: The board rejected the former because
petitioners had misspelled one of the names of the petitioners, for failure to state the
reason for unionizing, failure to properly authorize the list, failure to authenticate that
workers were over 14 years of age, one worker on the list denied having attached his
signature, and the board’s inability to verify that the plant had a minimum of twenty
workers (the plant having suspiciously closed the very day the board came to inspect for
verification; in the case of the latter, for failure to submit two copies of the petition,
failure to elect its executive committee, for the misspelling of one out of 728 workers’
names, failure to establish bylaws regarding union’s assets, and unclear bylaws
concerning member discipline. Some of the causes for rejection do not fall under any of
the reasons listed under registration requirements (LFT 356, 371). Further, the LFT
stipulates that the board has the responsibility to invite the workers to correct their
petition’s deficiencies (LFT 685). In any event, having reviewed the relevant documents,
the NAO found the petitioners had satisfied all registration requirements. The union filed
an amparo* with the District Court for Labor Matters, but subsequently found itself
sunable to pursue its amparo when its workers withdrew their claim in exchange for
severance payments. In sum, the boards obstruct the establishment of independent unions.
*

an amparo is somewhat akin to a judicial appeal alleging illegal government action.
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Although a few of the grounds for rejection likely have some validity, lack of
substantiation characterize others or reveal a gross distortion of the LFT.13
NAO consultants “concluded that [labor boards] generally [….] are known to be
fair, impartial and unbiased, especially regarding their role in matters dealing with the
rights of individuals; in collective matters, however, their activity is deemed to be more
controversial. [Indeed,] in Mexico generally, [they] are biased in favor of companies,
especially in matters of collective bargaining” and by extension favor business’ officialist
allies.14
We conclude from the problematic behaviors' surface appearance that the boards
wield significant discretion in certifying collective labor actions at labor's expense.
Discretion has the advantage of endowing the implementing agency with flexibility to
address the particulars of each case across time. The converse of such discretion is that
the agency's policy implementation depends to a high degree on the attitude of the
agency's personnel.

b) Business Associations.
The business sector enjoys one of the best organizations in Latin America. Its
concerted action attests to neoliberalism's pivotal role in Mexican politics and by
extension helps explain the states’ lack of commitment to labor rights. Because business
wields so much power it has in effect co-opted the state. These business organizations
underpin the continuity characterizing neoliberalism embrace. Business articulate their
neoliberal economic agenda through these organized media outlets.
Four principal private business organizations share the reins of corporate power:
COPARMEX, the Council of Mexican Businessmen (Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de
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Negocios: CMHN), the Business Coordinating Council (Consejo Coordinador
Empresarial: CCE), and the Trade Coordinator for Business Entreprises (Coordinadora de
Organismos Empresariales de Comercio Exterior: COECE). Although the Confederation
of National Chambers of Commerce (Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de
Comercio: CONCANACO) had a promising beginning as the official business entity,
COPARMEX, CMHN, CCE, and COECE have displaced the latter as the organ by which
business interests dominate the state.
These organizations range from the exclusive CMHN, which consists of the forty
largest corporations, to COPARMEX, which includes many small and medium sized
businesses. Further, their influence reflects their exclusivity, with CMHN decisively
carrying the most weight in government policy decisions. For instance, CMHN annually
announces at Los Pinos (the Mexican equivalent of the White House) their investment
commitments for the coming year, an exhortatory fanfare directed to promote the
Mexican market. Such heft provides CMHN with unique political leverage. CMHN has
monthly luncheons where members gather to discuss economic policy issues of the day
with senior cabinet officials in a closed press environment. A highpoint in its political
influence came in 1987 when the PRI President de la Madrid, asked CMHN to interview
its top six presidential candidates before choosing his successor. Notwithstanding this last
high profile seminal political event, CMHN prefers discretion. CMHN has made itself the
funding backbone of the other more visible business organizations. The CCE has its own
research and public relations corps. Reflecting its essential role in financing these other
organizations, CMHN invariably holds their presidencies. CCE is the peak business
confederation including both CMHN and COPARMEX. COECE is CCE’s auxiliary
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committee concerned with trade agreements. It coordinated support for NAFTA among
businessmen and helped design the agreement. COECE flanked the Mexican
government’s NAFTA delegation, often hovering directly outside closed-door intergovernmental meetings to advise Mexican political representatives. Business interests
have a privileged rapport with government principals whom they persuade, cajole and
pressure. Thanks to these business organizations, the state often appears business'
handmaiden, which leads to a biased arbiter in the case of the labor boards as we shall
see.15

c) How Companies Undermine Unions.
Business interests also protect their interests at the level of the company,
especially when it comes to minimizing independent unionization as much as possible.
General Motors provides a telling example of corporations’ deliberate strategy in this
regard. Its three main stratagems include heavily screening job applicants to remove
potential union activists from their midst, operating a divide and conquer strategy mostly
through a hierarchical pay schedule, and offering low-budget, but valuable amenities to
workers provided by pseudo-unions. The first ploy amounts to scrutinizing job
applicants’ “credentials.” Desired applicants typically have a ninth-grade education with
family members to support and high monthly rent payments, qualities deemed amenable
to long-term employment. Once applicants meet these requirements, they undergo a
battery of physical and psychological tests to determine their ability to adapt to line work.
This filtering process results weeds out 75% of applicants because they do not fit the
searched for profile. By dividing the workforce through differential pay scales for same
work GM obviates the potential for an esprit de corps forming between the various firms
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in its integrated enterprise (including input suppliers and assembly plants). Such foresight
stems from its fearing the debilitating consequences of production-wide work-stoppages.
GM also essentially segregates workers per plant by gender to take advantage of general
distrust across gender lines, reaching levels of 80% gender exclusivity. GM also
considers women more pliant as do many maquiladoras belying their they
pronouncement to the contrary. The company finances union social workers to advise
workers on how to handle workers’ new found moneys. These ersatz union
administrators become in effect workers’ accountants upon which the workers in turn
come to depend. GM thus has a multi-faceted and effective strategy to discourage
independent unionization.16 Employers commonly have little hesitation in committing
labor improprieties because they know well enough that workers in economic straits have
little choice but to sign a severance agreement, thereby relinquishing their claims against
the company, rather than pursue a lengthy arbitration to obtain justice. The employers’
arsenal comprises other weapons such as to falsely accuse employees of crimes, to have
job applicants sign “blank sheets” as a condition for their employment, which employers
can subsequently fill out as fits their needs and to compile “black lists” of recalcitrant
workers all of which pressure fired workers to sign severance agreements.17
Businesses also resort to ghost unions and outright intimidation and threats of
violence. Ghost unions permit businesses to exclude independent unions thanks to a legal
sleight of hand. They form roughly 90% of collective bargaining agreements and thereby
help explain business’ ability to thwart the formation of independent unions (see infra).
Business’ armamentarium to defeat independent unions also comprises direct
intimidation and threats of physical violence. When workers at a General Electric
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Mexican subsidiary initiated a campaign to elect an independent union, the firm harassed
them as they attempted to distribute campaign literature and fired some 20 activist
workers for having met with a United Electrical Workers auxiliary delegation.18
Widespread irregularities undermine union elections' authenticity. Han Young offered to
pay $2 000 to an activist leader at its plant if he desisted from organizing and $125 to
each worker who voted for the CTM union against the independent union. At the TAESA
election (see supra) TAESA had hired “armed soldiers . . . with heavy caliber arms [on
the premises including on the roof], attack dogs, an electrified wire” and concert speakers
blaring the TAESA theme song. This combination of business' anti-union preventive and
coercive tactics exemplifies some of the difficulties independent union organizers face.
Given this overt hostility to independent union formation, it should come as no surprise
that, thanks to their organizational heft, business influence on the boards in conjunction
with the boards discretion, leads to boards that implement a labor policy agreeable to
business interests and to labor's detriment.

4. Who Benefits and Who Suffers under the Present Situation.
The state-business alliance completely smothers independent union efforts.
Without genuine union representation workers have very little bargaining power and their
remuneration and working conditions suffer as a consequence. Business exploits the
favored position it now enjoys vis-á-vis the state, by brazenly violating workers’ rights
knowing full well that the state only half-heartedly enforces the LFT. As a result,
business increases its profits at the expense of labor. This pro-business conjuncture
applies especially to the EPZs where the state gives relative free rein to the maquiladoras
to attract the foreign direct investment (FDI) Mexico needs to pay off its foreign debts.
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Given that business has captured the state, these two win under present labor relations.
The losers are independent unions and the unrepresented masses of Mexican workers.19

5. Conclusion.
The state is closely tied with business interests, especially in union formation.
Business enjoys unrivaled access to the state thanks to its powerful business
organizations promoting a labor flexibility agenda. At the plant level it adopts an
aggressively anti-union approach to personnel management. Additionally, employers
readily use more direct and forcible methods to disrupt independent unionization. In sum,
the labor boards and business constitute a formidable front more or less united in
thwarting independent union activity.

Part III: Explanations of the Causes of the Behavior that
Comprise the Difficulty.
1. Introduction.
To explain the actors' behavior we now apply the ROCCIPI methodology. The
acronym stands for Rule, Opportunity/Capacity, Communication of Law, Process,
Interest, and Ideology. ROCCIPI ensures a comprehensive analysis to best understand the
causes of the behaviors constituting the difficulty, which our legislative proposal will
ultimately have to address to ensure its effectiveness. After presenting the Mexican
Constitution's fundamental role in defining workers' rights, we consider in turn, our two
role occupants, i.e., the labor boards and business. To this effect, we apply the ROCCIPI
analytical framework, with respect to each role occupant. We accord pride of place to the
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LFT rule most pertinent to the role occupant in question and then proceed with the rest of
the ROCCIPI agenda.

2. Explaining the Actor’s Behavior according to ROCCIPI.
a) The Mexican Constitution and the LFT.
The Mexican Constitution in Article 123, Title VI “Of Labor and Social Security”
provides that business and workers have the right to organize themselves into
associations representing their particular interests and that workers have the right to
strike: Art 123: “XVI. Workers as well as business owners will have the right to come
together with each other in defense of their respective interests; forming unions,
professional associations, et cetera;” “XVII. The Constitution itself neglects to offer
guidelines to curb discretion in implementing labor rights. As we shall see, this role of
filling in the essential details devolves to the LFT.

b) Labor Boards
The labor boards systematically impede union registration.

i. LFT Rule: Union Registration.
Theoretically one can easily establish a union. To form a union requires a
minimum of 20 workers (LFT 364). To register, the union must file the following
documentation: an authenticated copy of the minutes of the constituent assembly, a list of
members with their name, residence, and place of work, an authenticated copy of the
union’s bylaws, and an authenticated copy of the minutes for the election of the board of
directors (LFT 365). The union’s secretary general, organizing secretary and minutes
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secretary retain the right to authorize the above documents unless the union’s bylaws
stipulate otherwise (LFT 365). The board can only refuse to register the union if the
union does not aim to better workers’ interests; if the union does not have the required 20
members; or if the union does not file the right documentation (LFT 356, 366). Once 60
days have elapsed since filing the petition the workers can demand that the board
announce its decision. After a further three days if the board still has yet to decide the
board must automatically registered (LFT 366). If more than one union contends to
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, the union with the most
votes gains the right to negotiate (LFT 388). Disputes over who has the most votes take
place like any other labor dispute before the boards (LFT 892-895). Either party can also
call for a recount (LFT 931). Employers must negotiate with the representative union or
face a strike (LFT 387). Finally, the Panel on Representatives’ Responsibility (Jurado de
Responsabilidades de los Representantes) comprised of the usual tripartite structure can
sanction, including with a dismissal, those representatives who participate in proceedings
in which they have a conflict of interest; who impose unjustified delays; or who vote for a
resolution that is patently illegal or unjust (LFT 671-674, 707-708). The board’s
Presiding Officer has the obligation to investigate and mete out appropriate sanctions to
officials and staff other than the representatives (LFT 637). A tripartite committee of
representatives constitutes the feedback mechanism, which has the responsibility to
inform the Secretary of Labor of any deficiencies in the boards functioning (LFT 614).

ii. OCCIPPI: Labor Boards
The rules reveal that the boards have decisive opportunities and capacity to thwart
independent union efforts. They wield full discretion in ascertaining the outcomes of
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labor conflicts. These present themselves most notably when unions attempt to register
with the boards. The boards' wide discretion ties into the fact that the rules effectively
insulate them from oversight. Although in theory the tripartite representative committees
and ultimately the Secretary of Labor aught to hold the board members accountable no
evidence indicates that anyone ever actually holds them as such in any of the sources
reviewed. In such a situation unaccountability prevails. The rules stipulate that the
eligible members of the board have the responsibility to oversee, reprimand and
otherwise punish LFT violations. In this respect, one should praise the rule requiring the
dismissal of a member guilty of issuing a blatantly unjust ruling. Yet, because each of the
tripartite bodies oversees itself, the members are accountable only to themselves and
therefore to no one. To make matters worse, when the state intervenes to reprove its
board member, it did not seek to uphold the LFT. Quite the contrary, for instance, it has
pressured the state board member into resigning or simply fired them when these latter
have seen fit to respect the law and approved independent union registration activity as in
the Han Young case.20
Communication of the law remains a critical problem. The boards do provide
detailed written copies of the grounds on which they based their decision to each party
thereby allowing the parties to contest the decision with an amparo. However, while the
boards require registration of collective bargaining agreements and the unions that
negotiated them, there is no public registry where workers can verify whether a union,
which may be claiming to represent them, already exists. In practically all the cases
mentioned above, workers did not know that a union already existed until they discovered
it through their efforts at unionization. Yet, complaints require the name of the parties so
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that the board can give notice to the opposing party (LFT 751). What should be a mere
formality becomes an insuperable obstacle because the boards do not provide a public
registry where workers can ascertain the name of the opposing party.
In terms of process, the boards lack accountability in that decisions that
egregiously contravene the law and standards of justice do not bring about the reprove or
destitution of the responsible authorities. In practice , the boards habitually violate their
own stipulated deadlines and, yet, the boards have not shown themselves willing to hold
their own accountable for such violations. Finally, feedback is the responsibility of a
committee comprised of the tripartite representatives, which poses additional glaring
conflict of interest problems.
The board, as part of the state apparatus, favors business interests both because
businessmen occupy the highest echelons of power and because of a general business
persuasion at all levels of government as the top-tier inexorably diffuses its predilections
to its subordinates. Furthermore, even were the state is not so closely tied to business
interests a vibrant economy is the sine qua non of a successful political term. Neoliberal
economic ideology, besides dovetailing with business interests, admonishes that to attract
domestic and foreign investment requires labor peace and flexibility. In this light, the
boards become the state’s critical instruments to encourage such a receptive investment
environment by curtailing the development of independent unions, which might disrupt
labor peace.
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c) Business.
i. LFT Rule: Labor Standards.
Mexican labor laws embody some of the most progressive labor rights in the
world when written and remain so today. The Constitution spells out in Article 123 Title
VI “Of Labor and Social Considerations” workers’ rights to satisfactory remuneration
and working conditions, including: a maximum of eight-hour work days, six days a week,
a minimum wage, overtime pay, severance pay, profit sharing, occupational safety and
health standards and protection from dismissal without just cause. Businesses must
adhere to the minimum labor standards set out in the Constitution and detailed in the
LFT, as well as, stipulations of any collective bargaining agreements or other contracts
they enter into (LFT 919). Furthermore, they cannot negotiate a reduction in labor
conditions from those in force (LFT 394). They must negotiate with the representative
unions at their instigation (LFT 387). Though offering to protect labor rights the rules
allow for too much discretion and omit sanctions for violations.

ii. OCCIPPI: Business
Although in its broad outlines the law offers some protection to labor rights, it
still provides large loopholes or opportunities of which unprincipled employers take
advantage. Given the employers’ obligation to negotiate with the standing union, they
have every incentive to engage the services of a compliant union before employees form
a more assertive union. By employers preempting a truly representative union unionizers
face the tremendous difficulty of dislodging the incumbent union (see supra). "Protection
contracts" aptly refer to these contracts negotiated between employers and pliant unions,
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which represent some 90% of collective bargaining agreements. These unions often exist
only on paper, an existence, which workers only discover to their dismay upon filing to
establish their own union (hence the term ghost union). CTM offers such conciliatory
unions. In exchange for legitimizing the employer sponsored workers union, CTM
receives payment from the said employer and, in tandem, deepen their ranks and thus
strengthen their overall sway in the neoliberal system.21 As the purveyor of funds and the
linchpin of economic growth, business persuades, cajoles and coerces state officials and
corrupt union leaders.
Regarding communication of the law, businesses know precisely the law and the
loopholes that it affords. As for process, we have seen supra their role on labor boards, as
well as, their disreputable, even criminal activities aimed at forcibly preventing the
formation of independent unions. While the state inspects businesses for labor violations,
unfortunately it has neither the commitment nor the resources to implement an effective
inspection scheme as the NAO reports: “Notwithstanding repeat inspections, however,
serious unabated violations were allowed to continue over this entire period [19931997].”22
Business has primordial loyalty to their bottom line. To ensure the largest profits
possible business does everything it can to repress wages. To stay competitive, they seek
the greatest possible flexibility including notably control over production and therefore
workers. On both these issues business oppose truly representative labor unions and, as a
result, seeks to discourage them. Business does not have an incentive to idly sit back till
independent unions form and then negotiate with them because the ensuing labor strikes
disturb the labor peace upon which business relies. They go so far as to relocate, rather
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than deal with an assertive union. Since relocation is expensive, however, they often
times choose tactics in the penumbra between the legal and the criminal, which
undermine independent union formation. Businesses' neoliberal economic policy, which
their business organizations push, encompass the tenets of labor flexibility at the service
of business interests.

3. Conclusion.
In sum, the LFT ambitiously attempts to protect workers, but, unfortunately
leaves gross loopholes, of which opportunistic state officials and businessmen readily
take advantage to the detriment of workers’ rights. Because collective labor conflicts
have the potential to threaten Mexico's neoliberal agenda, the labor boards refuse to
adequately implement the LFT to enforce collective labor rights. Although, in most
respects, they do not violate the LFT's explicit provisions, they eviscerate its spirit, i.e., to
defend workers' rights. They depart from the LFT's spirit, if not its letter, by legitimizing
protection contracts and ghost unions, obstructing independent unions' registration,
arbitrarily prohibiting strikes, their absence in overseeing union elections, their
underwriting exclusion clauses and, in general, wielding unchecked discretion to
prejudice independent unions. Any valid proposal for solution will have to address these
issues. This analysis lays a basis in facts, logically organized, for designing detailed
provisions in our bill to alter or eliminate the problematic behaviors' causes, and induce
role occupants to behave in ways likely to ensure more effective protection of workers'
efforts to organize independent unions, which can represent and protect them in their inplant conflict with management.
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Part IV: Proposal for Solution.
1. Introduction.
Having examined the problem and its causes we now turn to proposed solutions.
In line with legislative theory, our proposed bill's detailed provisions logically aim to
alter or eliminate the objective and subjective causes of the relevant role occupants'
behaviors that, in the past, contributed to thwarting workers' efforts to build independent
trade unions. We present the two main alternative proposals for improving labor
conditions: reforming labor standards' regulatory framework of and the government's
plan to revise the labor boards. The former proposes to address labor conditions by
focusing on means other than strengthening independent labor unions. By presenting this
option, we ensure that we do not forego promising alternative proposals by limiting
ourselves to independent labor unions.
Next, we articulate our bill’s major provisions' details. We then demonstrate the
advantages our bill has over its rivals by explaining how each provision addresses the
specific causes underlying the problematic behaviors opposing independent labor unions.
We also assess the costs and benefits of the bill and indicate monitoring mechanisms to
ensure feedback on the bill’s performance. One cannot overemphasize the importance of
these latter monitoring mechanisms because they both ensure feedback on the bill's
effectiveness whether fault resides in its construction or in the agency's implementation.
In this head, we consider the very real possibility that independent unions will ineluctably
become like their predecessors, neoliberal instruments rather than genuinely representing
the workers. We then conclude.
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2. Alternative Proposals for Solutions.
There are three means the state can institute to improve and protect workers’
conditions: Regulatory labor standards, labor relations reform and direct state social
provisions (social security etc.).23 Considering in passing the latter option first, social
provisions require funds. Unfortunately, budget strictures combined with austerity
measures, which international financial institutions have pressed upon Mexico appear to
bar an expansion of the welfare state.
Reforming the regulatory framework of labor standards has its attractiveness in its
ostensible simpliciy. Government promulgates the appropriate standards and an agency
(in the case of Mexico, the Secretary of Labor) implements them. However, such a policy
has its complications. Mexico has one of the most regulated labor markets in the world
including stipulations as to minimum wage, dismissals restricted to just cause, and
detailed health and safety standards. The weak link, as it were, the Secretary of Labor,
does not and/or cannot perform its job adequately. The sheer vastness of the undertaking,
that is to say, inspecting the 100,000s of firms, signs the inspections' demise from the
beginning. Assuming a Secretary sincere in its mission, it would still face an
insurmountable challenge: Keeping the entire labor market in line with its labor
standards. Given the limited funding available, it does not seem reasonable to expect the
Secretary to successfully see its mission through. Furthermore, the government does not
have the conviction to root out violators. The government has a conflict of interest
because of its close ties to business. Whether under the present incumbent, the PAN, or
under the alternative PRI leadership, those with power remain in government; and the
business interests have the money and influence to arrogate to themselves this power.
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Thus when one says government, we should assume that state and business interests
coincide. Basically, only the very credulous would feel comfortable relying upon the
government to see through with minimum funding the formidable inspection scheme
necessary to effectively enforce labor standards throughout Mexico’s labor market.
Neither is the PAN proposal to reform labor relations and the labor boards a
credible remedy to unsatisfactory labor conditions. Its ostensible goal is labor market
flexibilization steeped in neocorporatism. The proposal, called the Abascal Project,
named after the former head of COPARMEX, now the head of the Secretary of Labor
under the PAN, is a blueprint for reinforcing neoliberal and anti-union policies, i.e., labor
market flexibilization. In addition to eviscerating labor protections, such as restrictions on
firing, it assaults protections on the right of workers to freely associate in independent
unions. It adds to the number of documents unions need, before the Secretary of Labor
will certify them as unions, documents that the Secretary of Labor has, but will not share
with the prospective unions. It limits the number of union applications to one at a time.
Given that it can take a year or more for the process to run its course, this requirement
serves to retard the formation of unions and therefore undermines their pertinence to
resolve problems in the here and now. The Abascal Project goes so far as to require that
workers favoring a union election identify themselves as such. This invites retaliation on
the part of the firm and their government allies. True, the proposal institutes secret ballots
in union elections; however, the previous identification requirement vitiates the purported
benefits of a secret ballot. For all Abascal Project’s objectionable clauses, its deficiencies
lie also in what it does not do. Absent is a requirement that the Secretary of Labor
provide a public registry for unions and collective bargaining agreements. Consequently,
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the authorities refuse workers the requisite information to form unions. The above
provisions reforming the labor boards, by their inclusion, as well as, their omission,
would serve to undermine existing labor protections and to entrench the unrepresentative
unions.24

3. Description of the Details of the Bill’s Major Provisions.
a) List of bill's major provisions.
The labor boards must…
•

require a union election even for the initial union registration.

•

provide for a public registry of union registrations.

•

be obligated to certify a union election within two weeks of a union petition.

•

secure a secret ballot for union elections.

Note: Fully protecting labor rights will require additional legislation, in particular,
legislation directly addressing business labor violations.

c) The bill's reforms.
We propose a bill, which revises the labor boards to strengthen independent labor
unions and thereby help to improve labor conditions. While the labor boards make
excessive, even insurmountable demands on challenging unions, they perfunctorily
accept a firm’s initial union. The present situation lends itself too readily to the
establishment of the discredited ghost unions and associated protection contracts.
Legislation should require a union election to legitimize this initial union organization.
Furthermore, the labor boards must provide a public registry of all union registrations,
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collective bargaining agreements and any other documentation required of union
petitions. They have the relevant information and can readily make it available to the
public. The law should oblige the labor boards to certify the holding of union elections
within two weeks of receiving the relevant petition. Also, democratic elections free of
intimidation demands a secret ballot and the labor boards should institute this measure.

4. How the Bill Addresses the Causes of the Difficulty.
The proposal eliminates those provisions that underpin unrepresentative unions.
The stricter review of initial union organization, where previously review was
nonexistent, aims to condemn protection contracts. These protection contracts presently
underpin the structure obstructing the formation of independent unions. The public
registry would by its very nature eliminate ghost unions. Workers could then verify who
supposedly represents them. Just as importantly, the public registry as a repository of all
documentation necessary to a successful petition would enable workers to avail
themselves of their right to hold union elections to replace existing unresponsive ghost
unions. The two week deadline on processing the union election request should give the
labor boards sufficient time to process the paperwork. Such a timetable would encourage
discontented workers to hold elections because their demands for representation would
bear fruit in the immediate future. The secret ballot prevents employers and ghost unions
from retaliating against particular workers since they would no longer know who was
behind the union election initiative nor who ultimately voted in favor of the newly
formed representative union.

5. Costs and Benefits of the Bill.
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The proposal’s reforms should impose minimal economic costs in terms of its
implementation. The labor boards would not have responsibility for any additional
oversight or implementation except as it pertains to reviewing the initial union
organizations. All in all, the labor boards’ structure would remain the same and would not
entail additional responsibilities and therefore resources.
Business interests’ bottom line may suffer due to their diminished ability to
exploit their workers. Business’ government allies would also find fewer opportunities on
the labor boards to intervene on the side of business. Since, the bill aims to redistribute
power from business to independent unions and by extension workers , we should view
the costs the state and business incur not as costs, but as the necessary consequence of
revitalizing workers’ rights.

6. Monitoring Performance.
The bill leaves very little discretion to the labor boards in terms of supporting the
implementation of the bill’s provisions after its promulgation. It mainly specifies what
the boards cannot do in terms of interfering with their formation. Where the bill directs
the boards to do something, as in the case of the public registry, nongovernmental
organizations should serve to monitor that the boards actually implement the bill's
relatively straightforward provisions.The independent unions embody the bill’s
monitoring linchpin. Once in place, they will serve as the boards' principal monitor.
Independent of the state and business they will have as their sole purpose and interest will
the defense of workers’ rights.
By removing the obstacles to independent unions, we expect them to flourish. The
bill's provisions, in particular, those which removes the prohibitory red tape and requires
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secret ballots promises workers the freedom to unionize. To realize their empowerment,
nongovernmental organizations such as independent unions and human rights
organizations, both domestic and international will have to participate in training workers
to take advantage of their newfound right to organize. Fortunately, organizations
promises to fill this need. International unions such as the United Electrical Radio &
Machine Workers of America International, Human Rights Watch, and FAT have
stepped into the brink to assist in empowering workers. Indeed, we can expect to see
these nongovernmental organizations monitoring Mexican labor conditions, as well as,
training union organizers given that their activism and research already underwrite this
legislative research report. Those unions that ignore workers' demands will find
themselves losing their incumbency. Ultimately, however, our bill having empowered
workers to freely unionize, relies on workers' commitment to improving their lot.
Therefore, the combination of explicit prohibitions, limited discretion and
accountability, assistance on the part of nongovernmental organizations and the
development of independent unions themselves should enable adequate monitoring of the
bill's implementation and thereby secure independent and representative labor unions to
improve labor conditions in Mexico.

7. Conclusion.
Thus, neither additional social provisions, improved labor standards nor the
present government’s proposal of reinforcing anti-union neoliberal policies viably
promise to improve labor conditions. Our proposal focuses on eliminating the obstacles
to the formation of independent unions. Its advantages consist in that it addresses the
various means that explain businesses' and governmental allies' problematic behavior
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while retaining the general structure of the relevant implementing agency. Its cost and
benefits tend to reflect the undermining of the neoliberal state-business alliance and as
such inevitably hurt business and their government supporters. However, workers’
conditions will significantly improve with a dedicated advocate on its behalf, i.e.,
independent unions. Finally, the bill incorporates monitoring considerations at various
levels to restrict board members discretion and increase their accountability, including,
first and foremost, through the separation of powers associated with the introduction of
independent unions as a viable power favoring workers’ rights and a continued reliance
on nongovernmental organizations to monitor progress.

Part V: Conclusion.
Mexican labor legislation is remarkable in the protection it promises workers.
However, these provisions have mainly remained paper tigers. Especially in the last
decade, working conditions have declined, in part, because of the increasing race to the
bottom entailed by globalization and the spread of neoliberal economics. However, in
recent times, under pressures for flexibilization, unions have seen their influence decline.
As a result, workers have been left to fend for themselves. Legislation governing the right
of association and union activity have up till now successfully prevented the formation of
alternative, genuinely democratic unions to vindicate their rights. Labor standards in
themselves and the government’s proposal of reinforcing anti-union neoliberal policies
have limited promise. However, our bill proposes to remove the obstacles to the
development of independent unions and invigorate workers’ rights. It would redistribute
power to workers through the instrument of independent unions in large measure thanks
to imparting these independent unions and other nongovernemntal organizations with the
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role of monitoring working conditions. Through the promotion of independent unions the
bill should go far in improving labor conditions in Mexico.
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GLOSSARY:
ASSA: Association of Flight Attendants of Mexico/Asociación de Sindical de
Sobrecargos de Aviación de México
CAT: Center for Worker Support/Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador
CCE: Business Coordinating Council/Consejo Coordinador Empresarial
CEN: National Executive Committee/Comité Ejecutivo Nacional
CMHN: Council of Mexican Businessmen/Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios
COECE: Trade Coordinator for Business Entreprises/Coordinadora de Organismos
Empresariales de Comercio Exterior
CONCANACO: Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce/Confederación de
Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio
COPARMEX: Mexican Employers’ Confederation/Confederación Patronal de la
República Mexicana
CT: Labor Congress/Congreso del Trabajo
CTM: Confederation of Mexican Workers/Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos
EPZ: Export Processing Zone
FAT: Authentic Labor Front/Frente Auténtico del Trabajo
FDI: Foreign direct investment
GM: General Motors
ISI: Import Substitution Industrialization
LFT: Federal Labor Law/Ley Federal del Trabajo
NAALC: North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
NAO: National Administrative Office
NGO: Non governmental organization
PAN: National Action Party/Partido de Acción Nacional
PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution/Partido de la Revolución Demócrata
PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party/Partido Revolucionario Institucional
ROCCIPI: Rule, Opportunity/Capacity, Communication of Law, Process, Interests, and
Ideology
SNTETA: National Union of Air Transport Workers/Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores
y Empleados del Transporte Aéreo
SUTERM: Union of Electrical Workers/Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Electricistas de
la República Mexicano
TAESA: Executive Air Transport/Transporte Aereos Ejecutivos
UNT: National Workers Union/Unión Nacional de Trabajadores
SNTE: National Union of Workers in Education/Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de
la Educación
SUTERM: Exclusive Union of Mexican Electrical Workers/Sindicato Único de
Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana

35

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
1

La Botz, Dan and Alexander, Robin “Mexico’s Labor Law Reform: Employers’ Rights vs. Associational
Rights.” Guild Practitioner 60:3 (Summer 2003): 149-161.
2
Roman, Richard and Arregui, Edur Velasco “Neoliberalism, Labor Market Transformation, and WorkingClass Responses: Social and Historical Roots of Accommodation and Protest.” Latin American Perspective
28:4 (July, 2001): 52-71
3
Caulfield, Norman “Labor Relations in Mexico: Historical Legacies and Some Recent Trends.” Labor
History 45:4 (November 2004): 445-467
4
Trading Away Rights: The Unfulfilled Promise of NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement
5
NAFTA’s 10 Year Failure to Protect Mexican Workers’ Health and Safety
6
Fairris, David What Do Unions Do in Mexico? (July, 2005)
7
Freeman, Richard B and Medoff, James L What Do Unions Do? Basic Books: New York, 1984
8
De la Garza, Enrique “El Sindicalismo Mexicano Frente a la Transición Política’ Cuadernos de Cendes
V18,47 (May-August 2001): 181-206
9
Báez-Camargo, Claudia From Silent Acquiescence to Active Resistance: Labor’s Leaders’ Response to
Market-Oriented Economic Reform, 1082-2000 Notre Dame, IN: Ph.D Dissertation (2002)
10
Middlebrook, Kevin J. “The Politics of Industrial Restructuring: Transnational Firms’ Search for Flexible
Production in the Mexican Automobile Industry” Comparative Politics: 23:3 (April, 1991) 275-297
11
Williams, Heather L. “Of Labor Tragedy and Legal Farce: The Han Young Factory Struggle in Tijuana,
Mexico” Social Science History: 27,4 (Winter 2003): 525-50
12
Carty, Victoria “Organizing in the Maquila Industry in Mexico: Implications for New Social Movement
Theory” International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 41,1 (April 2004): 59-78
13
Public Report of Review of NAO Submission No. 2003-1 re: Matamoros Garment and Tarrant
14
Public Report of Review of NAO Submission No. 940002 re: Honeywell and General Electric
15
Schneider, Ben Ross “Why Is Mexican Business So Organized?” Latin American Research Review 37: 1
(2002): 77-118
16
Rothstein, Jeffrey S. “Creating Lean Industrial Relations: General Motors in Silao, Mexico” Competition
& Change 8: 3 (September 2004): 203-221
17
Public Report of Review of NAO Submission No. 940002 re: Honeywell and General Electric
18
Public Report of Review of NAO Submission No. 940002 re: Honeywell and General Electric
19
Cooney, Paul “The Mexican Crisis and the Maquiladora Boom: A Paradox of Development or the Logic
of Neoliberalism?” Latin American Perspectives 28:3 (May, 2001): 55-83
20
Williams, Heather L. “Of Labor Tragedy and Legal Farce: The Han Young Factory Struggle in Tijuana,
Mexico” Social Science History 27: 4 (Winter 2003): 525-50
21
American Center for International Labor Solidarity Justice for All: The Struggle for Worker Rights in
Mexico Solidarity Center: United States, 2003
22
Public Report of Review of NAO Submission No. 9702 Part II re: Han Young
23
Botero, Juan et al The Regulation of Labor (2002)
24
“Human Rights Watch February 9, 2005 Letter to Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies.” Mexican Labor New
& Analysis 10:2 (February, 2005)

36

